The Influence of Personality and Losses on Search in Decisions From Experience by Hay, Michael Mordechai
Louisiana State University 
LSU Digital Commons 
LSU Master's Theses Graduate School 
2-20-2020 
The Influence of Personality and Losses on Search in Decisions 
From Experience 
Michael Mordechai Hay 
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses 
 Part of the Industrial and Organizational Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hay, Michael Mordechai, "The Influence of Personality and Losses on Search in Decisions From 
Experience" (2020). LSU Master's Theses. 5060. 
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/5060 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu. 
THE INFLUENCE OF PERSONALITY AND LOSSES ON SEARCH 







A Thesis  
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the  
Louisiana State University and  
Agricultural and Mechanical College  
in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  













Michael Mordechai Hay  






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................iii 
 
      CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................1 
Decisions from Experience........................................................................................2 
The Sampling Paradigm………..................................................................................7 
Variability in Search………......................................................................................10 
The Five-Factor Model of Personality.....................................................................15 
 





 CHAPTER III. ANALYSIS...........................................................................................29 
       





 APPENDIX A. DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE................................................41 
 
      APPENDIX B. THE BIG FIVE INVENTORY.............................................................42 
 
 APPENDIX C. SAMPLE GAMBLES...........................................................................44 
 
      APPENDIX D. COPY OF IRB APPROVAL……………………................................45 
 








Research in decision making has focused increasing attention on understanding search 
behavior without focusing on how individual differences might influence people’s search 
behavior. To increase our understanding of this topic, the present study examined how 
personality predicted the amount of search an individual engages in before making a risky 
decision. It was hypothesized that conscientiousness would be a positive predictor of search 
behavior and would emerge as an even stronger predictor of search behavior when choosing 
between options with negative outcomes. It was also hypothesized that neuroticism would be a 
negative predictor of search behavior and that individuals with higher levels of neuroticism 
would search even less before making a decision that involve losses. The analysis did not support 
either hypothesis with none of the personality measures being significant predictors of search 
behavior for either the gain or the loss condition. However, a significant difference was found 
between the correlation coefficients of neuroticism by decision domain with neuroticism being 
associated with people searching less in the loss domain when compared to the gain domain, 
although the correlations themselves were not significant. Suggestions for future research in 
understanding search behavior are provided to enhance our understanding of individual 




CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
When making many important real-life decisions, people and organizations usually have the 
ability to explore different options before they commit to a choice. Exploring alternatives through 
information search plays a vital role for both individuals and organizations when it comes to 
adopting new technologies (Levinthal & March, 1981) and in determining which employees to hire 
(Barron and Bishop, 1985). For both of these types of decisions, individuals and organizations must 
rely on their own prior experiences and experiential sampling in the form of testing out different 
technologies or conducting job interviews to help guide them in making the right decision. Given 
the importance of these types of decisions (acquiring new technologies or firing employees tend to 
be both time consuming and costly), one would think that individuals and organizations would 
sample extensively before making a decision. Yet, research has found that most people only rely on 
a small number of samples before making a decision (Hau, Pleskac, & Hertwig, 2010). 
Additionally, there appears to be substantial individual variability regarding how much people 
search before making an experiential decision (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Fox & 
Hadar, 2006; Hills and Hertwig, 2010), raising the question of whether individual differences 
explain variations in search behavior.  
Understanding why people search differently is important because, in many organizations, 
adequately searching between different alternatives can be essential for employee satisfaction and a 
company’s bottom line. Take for instance, a situation where a company must choose between 
different health care providers to offer to their employees. While cost is usually a factor, many 
important experientially based questions come into play before making this decision (e.g., what type 
of quality does the provider offer, what is their reputation for customer service, etc.). Organizations 




Choosing a health care provider is only one example of countless instances where individuals can 
explore different options before making a major decision. Knowing why people search differently is 
essential for understanding and predicting which types of people will search more or less when 
given the option to search between different options freely. Despite the importance of understanding 
why there is substantial individual variability in instances where people have the option to search 
between alternatives, little research exists on the relationship between individual differences and 
search behavior. The purpose of the current study is to help fill this gap in the literature by 
examining how individual differences influence a person’s search behavior. I hypothesize that 
personality will help explain some of this variation in search because personality, and specifically 
the five-factor model (FFM) of personality, has been shown to correlate with a wide array of 
behaviors across individuals (Paunonen & Ashton, 2001). The FFM consists of five basic 
dimensions that can be used to describe individual variability regarding cognitive, social, and 
behavioral characteristics, which are relatively stable across an individuals’ life (McCrae & Costa, 
1994). The present study focuses specifically on the traits of conscientiousness and neuroticism in 
the context of search, both of which will be discussed further in a later section. Lastly, this study 
will also look at how choosing between options with possible negative outcomes (as opposed to 
options with only positive outcomes) in experiential decisions affects the relationship between 
personality and search.  
Decisions from Experience 
Every day individuals are faced with many decisions, such as deciding whether to move to a 
new state or to switch jobs and start a new career. In these examples, past experience and 
exploratory search play a pivotal role in guiding people’s decisions since there is no quantitative 




uncertainty and open-endedness where there is no clear single best answer or definitive rule on 
when to stop searching (Athukorala et al., 2015). These kinds of decisions are known as decisions 
from experience (DfE) because individuals remain unaware of what the potential payoffs are for 
each of the different options (e.g., happiness of moving for a job vs. not moving and staying with 
their current job) before making a decision. This type of decision differs from Decisions from 
Description (DfD), which occurs when the risks and potential payoffs of different choice options are 
known prior to making a decision (Hertwig et al., 2004).  
An example illustrating the difference between DfD and DfE is the game of roulette 
compared to slot machines. In roulette, assuming a person plays colors, the odds of winning are 
known before playing: they will have a 47.50% chance of getting red, 47.50% chance of getting 
black, and a 5% chance of getting green. What qualifies roulette as a game where people are 
constantly making DfD is that individuals remain aware of all possible outcomes (red, black and 
green) and also know what their respective odds are of getting each color prior to playing. On the 
other hand, when playing slots, individuals typically start off as being naive as to what all the 
possible payoff values are and are unaware of the chances of winning a prize before playing. 
Playing the slots classifies as a game involving DfE, because individuals remain unaware of what 
the potential payoffs are and because the way they learn about the frequency of the payoffs is by 
constantly playing and learning from experience.  
In their seminal paper on understanding the difference between people’s choice behavior in 
DfD and DfE, Hertwig and colleagues (2004) found a reversal in people’s choice preferences 
depending on how the options were presented. In their study, the authors had two groups of 
participants and compared their choice preferences. The first group was known as the description 




choose between different gamble options. The other group of participants was the experience group, 
whom were given the same gamble options as the description group but in an experiential format, 
where they were not told the probability of different gamble options beforehand. The participants in 
the experience group were presented two sample buttons on a computer screen, allowing them to 
sample between the different gamble options before making a decision. One example of the 
implementation of this method involves a gamble where participants could choose between either a 
guarantee of winning $4 or have an 80% chance of winning $5 and a 20% chance of winning 
nothing. In the description group, participants generally preferred the guaranteed winning of $4 
while the experience group typically preferred the gamble where they had an 80% chance of 
winning $5 and a 20% chance of winning $0. This reversal in preference is known as the 
description-experience gap. Understanding this gap has been of great interest to researchers because 
it explains individual choice preferences based on how the information is presented.  
One particularly interesting finding consistently observed in studies related to the 
description-experience gap relates to how people reacted to rare but consequential events (Wulff, 
Mergenthaler-Canseco, & Hertwig, 2018). Rare but consequential events are operationally defined 
as gamble outcomes where the probability of a rare event occurring is below 20%, and a common 
event is defined as an outcome which occurs greater than 20% of the time (Hertwig et al., 2004). 
Additionally, Wulff and colleagues also define rare but consequential events as outcomes which are 
typically characterized as being either the largest positive or negative outcome value in a gamble 
pair. Hertwig and Erev (2009) found a difference in how participants viewed the potential impact of 
rare but consequential events based on if the problems were presented to participants in a DfD or 
DfE format. Specifically, when participants had to choose between different gamble options in DfD, 




their objective probabilities before making a choice. However, when the same gambles were offered 
in a DfE format, participants tended to behave as if rare but consequential events had less of an 
impact than were warranted based on their objective probabilities.  
Part of the reason why there is such a discrepancy between people’s choice preferences in 
DfD and DfE is because of the differences in how information is presented to individuals between 
the two formats. Generally, DfE may be more difficult for individuals to make since DfE lacks the 
quantitative certainty that DfD provides. Instead, individuals must rely on exploratory search when 
they do not have prior life experiences to help form different mental representations of what the 
underlying probabilities of the different possible gamble outcomes are (Hertwig, 2015). 
Additionally, it is important to mention that reliance on exploratory search as a guide in DfE often 
comes with limitations.  
First, reliance on exploratory search in DfE limits individuals both by the information they 
can mentally store and by the finite amount of time to make a decision (Kareev, Arnon, & Horwitz-
Zeliger 2002). Limits in working memory can affect not only how many samples people rely on in 
DfE, but also how they perceive rare but consequential events. In a study examining the relationship 
between samples drawn in an experiential-based task and working memory capacity, Rakow, 
Demes, and Newell (2008) observed a moderate relationship between working memory capacity 
and the number of samples individuals drew (r = .36, p < .01). Specifically, individuals with smaller 
working memories tended to rely on a smaller number of samples before making DfE and they also 
tended to misperceive the frequency of rare but consequential events before making a choice. 
Secondly, when relying on exploratory search in DfE, collecting too much information can 
lead a decision maker to suffer from information overload resulting in diminished decision quality 




information overload and decision quality by surveying 108 MBA students. The survey asked 
participants if they usually experienced information overload and if so to what extent (mild, 
moderate, intense, or very intense). Afterward, participants were asked if information overload 
personally affected their task productivity or quality. The authors found a strong correlation 
between individuals who reported having a higher level of information overload and who felt that it 
impacted their work productivity (r = .37, p < .01) and work quality (r = .41, p < .01). In a related 
vein, participants who reported lower levels of information overload did not feel that it affected 
their work quality or productivity. 
 In a separate study looking at the effect of how multiple-choice options influence decision 
making, Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang (2004) examined whether offering more 401k fund options 
influenced the sign-up rate of such funds by employees. Results suggested that the more funds a 
company offered involving multiple 401k plans, the less people signed up for them. However, if a 
company offered only two funds, approximately 75% of employees signed up. Additionally, for 
every ten funds a company added to the plan, participant sign up rates declined between 1.5% to 
2%. The findings from this study indicated that when employees had too many options, they may 
not contribute to their 401k at all. Overall, both of these studies suggest that having too much 
information can be problematic, and in the long run, may inhibit the quality of subsequent decisions.    
Alternatively, not collecting enough information when searching can cause people to 
underestimate the frequency of rare but consequential events (Fox & Hadar, 2006). Fox and Hader 
reanalyzed the data from the paper by Hertwig and colleagues (2004) looking at the description-
experience gap and at how individual’s choice preferences were affected based on if the information 
was presented in a DfD or a DfE format. Fox and Hader concluded that a major reason why 




participants undersampling, which resulted in them never experiencing a rare but consequential 
event. One way this concept can be understood in the real world is the prevalence of many 
individuals who remain completely unprepared for a downsizing despite working in a recession 
prone industry like retail. In this example, a downsizing represents a relatively rare but 
consequential event, and the limited amount of time a person has worked in the retail industry 
without experiencing a downsizing represents an undersampling of the environment by the 
individual. However, before further discussing how these limitations affect decision making in DfE, 
it is first important to discuss how researchers examine people’s search behavior in the laboratory 
setting.  
The Sampling Paradigm 
 Choice behavior in DfE is typically studied using different experimental paradigms, 
including the sampling paradigm (Hertwig et al., 2004; Weber, Sharif, & Blais, 2004). In the 
sampling paradigm, participants are given two options (Option A and Option B) and are asked to 
choose between them. Each option contains specific payoff distributions, and participants can 
sample between each option for as long as they like before making a final selection. For example, 
say Option A pays $5, 100% of the time and Option B pays $25, 20% of the time, and $0, 80% of 
the time. A participant sampling from Option A three times will encounter different potential payoff 
values ($5, $5, $5) as compared to Option B where they would see other potential payoff values ($0, 
$25, $0). After an individual feels confident that they know which gamble option will pay the best, 
they can stop sampling and make a final choice where the computer will generate a random draw 
from the option they selected which participants get to keep. A representation of the sampling 
paradigm, along with how the same options would be presented in its equivalent DfD format, is 




 One way that the sampling paradigm could be understood using an analogous real-world 
example is a situation where a large company is looking to hire one of two different consulting 
firms to help its employees plan for retirement. Assuming that other important factors such as cost 
are equal, a manager working for a large company must rely on other factors for determining which 
consulting firm to select. In this scenario, a manager might use different means of search (reading 
online reviews or asking former clients what their experiences have been with each firm) as a way 
of forecasting what their experience with each firm will most likely be before they decide which 
firm to hire. In the laboratory setting, this scenario represents just one of many examples regarding 
how DfE is made in the real world.  
Using this paradigm over the past 15 years, researchers have learned a great deal about how 
people evaluate and make experiential decisions across a variety of different settings. Of the 
different paradigms that are used to study choice preferences in DfE, the sampling paradigm is the 
most common. Furthermore, decision-making preferences in DfE were measured using the sampling 
paradigm in the paper by Hertwig and colleagues (2004), which first observed the description-
experience gap. In a recent meta-analysis examining over 70,000 choices made by over 6,000 
participants using the sampling paradigm, Wulff and colleagues (2018) observed a robust 
description–experience gap when evaluating people’s choice preferences. In their meta-analysis, the 
authors found that two major factors contributed to the size of the description-experience gap. One 
major determinant of the description-experience gap is limited sampling by participants with the 
ensuing sampling error causing participants to misunderstand the actual frequency of events in DfE. 
Sampling error is a statistical and not a psychological phenomenon, and it represents the difference 
between the sampling experience that participants observe and the objective probabilities of a 




the gambles. Specifically, the types of gambles used (Glöckner, Hilbig, Henninger, & Fiedler, 2016) 
and whether or not the gambles contained loss values (Lejarraga, Hertwig, & Gonzalez, 2012) have 
both been shown to greatly impact the amount of search people engaged in using the sampling 
paradigm. Additionally, prior research has found that the type of cognitive search strategy a person 
employs also influences an individual’s search behavior (Hills & Hertwig, 2010). These findings 
and their relevance to understanding individual variability in search will be discussed in depth in the 
following sections.  
 
Figure 1. The sampling paradigm includes an initial phase whereby participants can sample 
between the two different options, which is represented by the six fictitious samples. The participant 
explores one of the two payoff distributions by clicking a specified sample computer key for each 
distribution on the computer. After participants choose to stop sampling, they will then see a choice 
screen which is shown with a black square surrounding it and are then asked to make a final 





Variability in Search 
Previous research has found substantial variability in people’s search behavior before 
making DfE. Prior research has attributed this search variability in the sampling paradigm to both 
external and internal factors (Wulff et al., 2018). External factors include the structure of the 
gambles used by researchers in the sampling paradigm as well as if the gambles involved earning or 
losing money. Internal factors, on the other hand, include the different types of search strategies an 
individual may employ as well as their emotional state during the experiment (Frey, Hertwig, & 
Rieskamp, 2014). 
Early studies consistently reported that participants relied on limited sampling before 
making a final decision (Fox & Hadar, 2006; Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010). Fox and Hadar found that 
one of the consequences of people undersampling is their tendency to be influenced by sampling 
error, which, as discussed previously, is when people misattribute the frequency of events in DfE as 
a result of what they have personally experienced when sampling. For example, if the objective 
odds behind Option A in a gamble is having an 80% chance of winning $10 and a 20% chance of 
winning nothing and a person samples from Option A three times and sees $10 three times in a row, 
they will likely incorrectly assume that Option A only pays out $10 despite there being a 20% 
chance that they will win nothing because they have not experienced the $0 payoff when sampling. 
In a study conducted by Hertwig and colleagues (2004), the typical amount of times a participant 
engaged in search (i.e., pressed the sample key) was approximately seven times for each gamble 
option, and the median amount of times a participant engaged in search was approximately 15 times 
per scenario. Additionally, in a separate paper, Hertwig (2015) describes the data from the Hertwig 
and colleagues (2004) study, highlighting that 44% of rare but consequential outcomes were not 




attributed to undersampling. This undersampling by participants is consistent with recent research 
suggesting that a major cause for why participants tended to undersample was the result of the 
structure of the gambles used (Glockner et al., 2016).  
Typically, previous studies have used gambles that either contained a certain option (a 100% 
chance of winning a certain payoff) or a risky option with one possible outcome being zero, or both 
within the gamble pairs. Glockner and colleagues (2016) refer to these types of gambles as reduced 
gamble pairs and theorizes that this type of gamble structure explains why people tend to 
undersample in DfE. Alternatively, in their study, Glockner and colleagues utilized a different type 
of gamble known as non-reduced gamble pairs wherein neither option in the gamble pair contained 
a certain or zero payoff value. For illustration, imagine two gamble options (A and B) with Option 
A representing a reduced gamble and Option B representing a non-reduced gamble. In this example, 
Option A (reduced) would be a gamble pair with an 80% chance of winning $4 and a 25% chance of 
winning nothing, while Option B (non-reduced) would be a 70% chance of winning $4.10 and a 
30% chance of winning $1.10. Option A represents a reduced gamble pair because it is possible for 
participants to win nothing, while Option B represents a non-reduced gamble because this type of 
gamble avoids both a certain option (a 100% chance of winning a value) and a zero payoff option (a 
20% chance of winning nothing). Using both types of gamble structures (reduced and non-reduced), 
Glockner and colleagues examined what effect gamble type had on search across three different 
studies. Results suggested that using non-reduced gamble pairs significantly increased the number 
of samples participants drew with a mean of 44 samples (SD = 31) drawn for the non-reduced 
gambles. Participants faced with non-reduced gambles sampled considerably more with this type of 
gamble structure when compared to the original study done by Hertwig and colleagues (2004), 




high standard deviation indicates, there is still a substantial amount of inter-individual variability 
when it comes to how much participants search in DfE.  
Outside of reduced and non-reduced gamble pairs, another type of gamble structure which 
has been found to influence search is whether the gambles contain loss only outcomes. Using the 
sampling paradigm, Lejarraga and colleagues (2012) found that losses invoked significantly more 
search by participants in loss only gambles compared to gain only gambles. The authors found that 
on average participants increased the number of times they sampled by 25% to 29% in the loss 
scenario but noted that there was substantial interindividual variability with this finding. One 
explanation Lejarraga and colleagues gave for why people searched more in the loss condition 
relative to the gain condition was loss aversion. Loss aversion represents people’s natural tendency 
to be more averse to the idea of losing money when compared to the prospect of earning an 
equivalent amount of money. In one study, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that the majority 
of people selected to be guaranteed a gain of $3,000 than have an 80% chance of gaining $4,000 
and a 20% chance of winning nothing. However, when the same gamble was changed to a loss only 
situation, there was a reversal in individual preference, with more people preferring the option of 
having an 80% chance of losing $4,000 (otherwise losing nothing) when compared to the 
guaranteed option of losing $3,000. This preference reversal in decision making can be attributed to 
loss aversion, suggesting that people tend to have a much stronger negative reaction to the thought 
of losing money compared to the prospect of gaining an equivalent amount of money (Sokol-
Hessner, Camerer, & Phelps 2013). Lejarraga and colleagues theorized that because participants felt 
more averse to the idea of losing money (as opposed to gains in money) in DfE, they increased their 




While the structure of gambles represents a key external factor that influences search 
behavior in DfE, there are also important internal factors that influence the number of samples that a 
person draws. One factor that has been used to explain some of the variability in DfE is the type of 
search strategy a person uses. Traditionally in DfE, individuals tend to use either a piecewise or a 
comprehensive search strategy before making a decision (Hills & Hertwig, 2010). Using a 
piecewise search strategy, individuals constantly switch back and forth between different options, 
whereas a comprehensive search strategy consists of individuals sampling extensively from one 
option before switching. An example that illustrates this type of search strategy in the context of an 
applied setting is how a potential employer might interview job candidates they call back for 
multiple rounds of interviews. Using a piecewise search strategy, an employer would call back job 
candidates for multiple rounds of short interviews before they called a different job candidate for 
their next series of interviews. Alternatively, using a comprehensive search strategy would entail an 
employer calling back job candidates for fewer rounds of longer interviews relative to the piecewise 
search strategy. For an employer, the type of search strategy that they end up using when 
interviewing job candidates can greatly influence how they perceive the quality of the applicants 
and who they ultimately decide to hire. Using a piecewise search strategy might lead an employer to 
hire the candidate who had the best first impression on one of the shorter interviews. On the other 
hand, for employers who used a comprehensive search strategy, they will most likely hire the 
candidate who had interviewed the best overall. In the context of the sampling paradigm 
specifically, Hills and Hertwig (2010) found that the type of search strategy (piecewise or 
comprehensive) a person employs not only influenced their choice but also how much they searched 
before making a decision. In piecewise sampling, participants constantly switched back and forth 




prefer the gamble options which displayed higher rewards in the most rounds of sampling. 
Alternatively, when using a comprehensive sampling strategy, participants sampled extensively 
from one of the gamble options before switching and generally preferred the option which yielded 
the highest average reward. Hills and Hertwig (2010) found that individuals who switched more 
when searching between the different gamble options tended to search less overall (r = −.37, p < 
.01). Additionally, they also found that individuals who tended to switch more between gamble 
options were more likely to underestimate the frequency of rare but consequential events before 
making a decision. In a separate study, Gonzalez and Dutt (2011) found that the number of switches 
or alternations between options (i.e., A-Rate) that individuals make decreases the more a person 
samples. As with overall search rate, previous research has found a great deal of variability in 
individual’s alternation rates as well (Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011; Hills & Hertwig, 2010).  
Lastly, in a study looking at how emotional states influence search behavior, Frey and 
colleagues (2014) split participants up into one of four different emotional state groups before 
having participants complete an experiment involving the sampling paradigm. To induce different 
emotional states (happiness, fear, anger, or sadness), participants were instructed to write about life 
events where they felt the targeted emotional state, and then were instructed to vividly recall their 
previously described life event for one minute prior to the first, fourth, and seventh round of the 
sampling paradigm. Frey and colleagues (2014) observed that participants in the fearful condition 
searched significantly when compared to participants in the happy condition (Mdraws= 45 vs. Mdraws 
= 28) but switched considerably less than the happy condition (Mswitching frequency= 6% vs. Mswitching 
frequency = 96%).   
Despite the past research looking at these explanations for variability in search, there is still 




DfE. The purpose of the current study is to help contribute to the literature in understanding search 
behavior in DfE by examining how individual differences in personality influences search behavior. 
Drawing from research on personality to explain variability in search, I propose that certain 
personality traits will predict which individuals tend to undersample and which individuals tend to 
sample more when compared to the average. Furthermore, I propose that differences in personality 
will also help explain and account for variability in search behavior, particularly in the case of loss 
gambles.  
The Five-Factor Model of Personality  
The Five-Factor Model (FFM) has been a major staple in helping to understand personality 
during the last half of the 20th century. The FFM has demonstrated high reliability and validity 
across cultures (McCrae & Costa, 1999; Schmitt, Allik, McRae, & Benet-Martinez, 2007), and has 
been found to remain relatively stable over time (McCrae & Costa, 1994). For researchers, it is 
important to understand individual personality for a variety of reasons. Personality research has 
shown that individual personality characteristics play a major role in influencing many different life 
outcomes such as health (Roberts & Bogg, 2004), well-being (Steel, Schmidt, & Shultz, 2008), and 
longevity (Martin & Friedman, 2000). While many people think of the personality traits of the FFM 
as binary (e.g., introverted or extraverted), most people tend to fall somewhere on the continuum for 
each trait (i.e., slightly more extraverted or introverted than the average person). 
The five personality factors of the FFM are as follows: conscientiousness, neuroticism, 
extraversion, openness, and agreeableness (Costa & McCrae, 1999). McCrae and John (1992) 
identify each dimension of the FFM broadly as follows: Conscientiousness refers to the extent to 
which a person is reliable, responsible, thorough, efficient, and organized. Neuroticism refers to the 




a person is active, talkative, energetic, enthusiastic, assertive, and outgoing. Openness to experience 
refers to the extent that a person is imaginative, insightful, curious, and artistic. Lastly, 
agreeableness is defined by the degree a person is generous, kind, sympathetic, appreciative, 
forgiving, and trusting.  
Conscientious individuals are known for their self-control and their ability to organize, plan, 
and deliberate before making a decision (McCrae & Costa, 1994; Costa, McCrae, & Dye, 1991). 
Because conscientious individuals have a higher level of self-control, they are also more prone to 
rational decision-making and tend to be less impulsive when making decisions. Looking at 
conscientiousness from a neurological perspective, DeYoung and colleagues (2010) found that 
conscientiousness was positively associated with volume differences within a person’s middle 
frontal gyrus (β = .43, p < .05), which is essential for maintaining information in a person’s working 
memory and for executing planned action. Overall, their findings provide support on a neurological 
level for why individuals with higher levels of conscientiousness can engage in more self-regulation 
and provides a partial explanation for why conscientiousness is a valid predictor of both academic 
and occupational performance.  
Regarding the relationship between conscientiousness and health, Bogg and Roberts (2004) 
found meta-analytic evidence that conscientiousness was negatively related to risky health 
behaviors such as alcohol (r = -.13, 95% CI [-.14, -.12]) and tobacco consumption (r = -.27, 95% CI 
[-.28, -.26]). Alternatively, conscientiousness was positively correlated with positive health 
behaviors such as maintaining a higher level of fitness (r = .13, 95% CI [.07, .19]), again providing 
evidence of the link between conscientiousness and self-control. In a separate study examining the 
relationship between personality and credit scores, Bernerth, Taylor, Walker, and Whitman (2012) 




overall credit score (r = .20, p < .05). This suggests that one of the reasons why conscientious 
individuals may be able to maintain good credit is because they are less prone to impulsive spending 
and are better at controlling their finances. In a similar vein to financial planning, past research has 
also found a link between conscientiousness and more deliberation in general (McCrae & Costa, 
1994; Costa et al., 1991). In the context of search in DfE, conscientious individuals may deliberate 
and plan more through the use of search when they are in the process of deciding which option to 
choose before they make a selection in DfE. 
Additionally, conscientiousness has been linked to having higher levels of accomplishment 
striving, which is defined as exerting more effort to complete work assignments (Barrick, Stewart & 
Piotrowski, 2002). In their study, Barrick and colleagues found a modest correlation between 
conscientiousness and accomplishment striving (r = .48, p < .01) using a sample of employees who 
worked in sales. Since accomplishment striving is a facet of conscientiousness, this trait may be 
relevant for motivating individuals to search more so they can accomplish their goal of earning as 
much money as possible. Thus, I hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 1: Conscientiousness will be a positive predictor of search in DfE. 
 
Figure 2. The hypothesized relationship between conscientiousness and the amount of search 
a person engages in. 
 
Regarding how search behavior is affected by gains or losses in conscientious individuals, it 
is predicted that losses will motivate individuals with higher levels of conscientiousness to search 




be more averse to the thought of losing their gains, it may be the case that conscientious individuals 
will search more to determine which option in the experiment will take the least amount of money 
from them. In a study looking at the relationship between conscientiousness and loss aversion, 
Boyce, Wood, and Ferguson (2016) examined how losses in income affected an individual’s level 
of overall life satisfaction based on their level of conscientiousness using a large longitudinal 
German socio-economic dataset. Results suggested that conscientious individuals were more loss 
averse, with individuals who had a higher score in conscientiousness reporting lower levels of life 
satisfaction, and a loss in income compared to individuals with lower levels of conscientiousness. 
Boyce and colleagues posit that one reason why conscientious individuals reported lower levels of 
life satisfaction stemming from a loss in income is because conscientious individuals may be more 
likely to attribute a loss of income to themselves because from some perceived lack of ability. 
Additionally, this perceived lack of ability in the context of loss might also explain why 
conscientious individuals tended to be more loss averse when compared to individuals with lower 
levels of conscientiousness. In the context of the present study, conscientious individuals may 
search more in the loss domain specifically to identify which gamble option is least likely to take 
away their gains as to minimize any feeling of loss. 
Another reason conscientiousness may exhibit more search for loss gambles compared to 
gain gambles is their locus of control. Generally, conscientiousness has been associated with higher 
levels of internal locus of control (Costa et al., 1991). Typically, previous research has classified 
locus of control as a hierarchical construct, where general locus of control represents the highest 
level of the hierarchy while domain-specific subdivisions like work locus of control are a part of the 
lower levels of the hierarchy (Barrick, Bowling, & Eschleman, 2010). General locus of control 




of their actions (Rotter, 1966) and work specific locus of control indicates how much a person 
believes that they can attribute success at work to their own actions (Spector, 1988). General locus 
of control is measured on a continuum with people who believe that they can control their outcomes 
having higher levels of internal locus of control. Alternatively, individuals who believe that luck or 
some other external factor determine their outcomes tend to have higher levels of external locus of 
control (Twenge, Zhang, & Im, 2004). When researching the relationship between 
conscientiousness and external locus of control, Costa and colleagues (1991), found a strong 
negative correlation between conscientiousness and external locus of control (r = -.25, p < .01) 
indicating a positive relationship between conscientiousness and internal locus of control. Overall, 
the findings of Costa and colleagues (1991) suggest that individuals with higher scores in 
conscientiousness are more likely to attribute both their success and failure to themselves rather 
than their environment. Relating to a person’s level of internal loci of control, previous research has 
also found that individuals who are more loss averse tend to engage in more protective measures to 
help prevent losses (Li, Kenrick, Griskevicius, & Neuberg, 2012). A person’s level of internal locus 
of control is expected to be relevant in influencing the amount of search that they engage in as it is 
expected that these individuals will be trying to influence their outcomes in the experiment (money 
earned) by sampling more to determine the best gamble option. I predict that conscientious 
individuals will be more likely to engage in more search in DfE through the use of increased 
sampling not only because they have higher levels of internal locus of control; but also because they 
will be trying to use search (sampling) as a protective measure to help minimize their losses in the 
experiment by determining which gamble option will take the least amount of money from them.  
Hypothesis 2: Conscientiousness will be a stronger predictor of search in the loss condition 






Figure 3. The hypothesized relationship showing that conscientious individuals will search 
more for loss gambles relative to gain gambles. 
 
Individuals high in neuroticism are known to be more impulsive, mercurial, unstable, and 
temperamental (Costa & McCrae, 1999; Goldberg, 1999). When looking at individual differences in 
neurological structures using the Big Five Inventory (BFI), DeYoung and colleagues (2010) found 
that neuroticism was associated with variations in different regions of a person’s brain (e.g., 
dorsomedial pre-frontal cortex, mid-cingulate gyrus). Based on these differences, DeYoung and 
colleagues (2010) suggest that these neurological variations explain why people with higher levels 
of neuroticism have higher sensitivities to threats, punishments and why neuroticism is associated 
with emotional dysregulation overall. Moreover, multiple studies have found that problem gamblers 
tend to have higher scores on neuroticism (Brunborg et al., 2016; Takeuchi et al., 2015), 
highlighting neuroticism’s association with more impulsive behaviors and less rational decision 
making, In a survey consisting of over 10,000 individuals, Brunborg and colleagues (2016) found 
that problem gamblers had significantly higher levels of neuroticism and lower levels of 
conscientiousness compared to the general population. In another study looking at neuroticism and 
impulsive eating disorders, Elfhag and Morey (2008) found a modest correlation (r = .48, p < .01) 
between neuroticism and emotional eating. These studies suggest that individuals who are high in 
neuroticism tend to be more impulsive when making a decision. Therefore, in the context of the 
present study, neuroticism may be associated with people searching less before they make a 




Another reason why neuroticism may be linked with less search is because of its association 
with lower levels of internal locus of control (Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002). In a meta-
analysis examining the relationships between external locus of control, emotional stability, self-
esteem, and generalized self-efficacy, Judge and colleagues (2002) observed a strong correlation 
between emotional stability and external locus of control (ρ = .40, 95% CI [.33, .48]). Due to the 
low levels of discriminant validity for each of these four traits, Judge and colleagues (2002) suggest 
that the four aforementioned traits may be representative of the same higher-order concept. This 
relationship between neuroticism and a lower locus of control may manifest itself in the context of 
the current study with neuroticism being associated with less search in DfE. Specifically, it may be 
the case that since these individuals will feel that they cannot influence their performance in the 
experiment, they might search less in DfE. Therefore, I hypothesize that neuroticism will be 
correlated with individuals searching less in DfE. 
 Hypothesis 3: Neuroticism will negatively predict search behavior in DfE. 
 
Figure 4. The hypothesized relationship between neuroticism and the amount of search a 
person engages in.  
 
Concerning how losses might affect the relationship between neuroticism and search, it is 
hypothesized that neuroticism will be associated with people searching less when it comes to losses 
relative to gains. In a previous study examining the relationship between barriers to information 
search among cancer patients and their physicians, Borgers and colleagues (1993) found 




condition. Specifically, the authors found that 20% of cancer patients claimed that nervousness was 
a primary reason why they did not seek out more information about their condition from their 
physician. Given that nervousness is a facet of neuroticism, and because it is expected that 
individuals will be more nervous in the loss gambles of DfE since they will be losing money. I 
predict that individuals with higher levels of neuroticism will search even less in loss gambles when 
compared to the gain gambles. 
Another reason why this is predicted to be the case is because past research had found 
neuroticism to be negatively correlated with performance when individuals were put in a high-
pressure situation (Byrne, Silasi-Mansat, & Worthy, 2015). In their study, Byrne and colleagues 
gave participants the dynamic decision-making task wherein participants had to select between one 
of two different decks on a computer screen in order to gain points. The first deck was the 
“increase” deck where participants were given a smaller reward upfront but caused the point payout 
of both options to increase over time. The second deck was the “decrease” deck, where participants 
received a greater amount of points upfront, but the payouts from both decks decreased over time. 
The best deck between the two was the “increase” deck which led to the highest payout over time, 
but the only way for participants to realize this was to rely on their working memories and 
remember the payouts from both options. Researchers split participants up into two conditions, the 
first being the low-pressure condition where participants only had to earn as many points as possible 
with no monetary compensation at the end of the experiment. Alternatively, participants in the high-
pressure condition were told they needed to reach a certain point threshold with a (fictitious) partner 
to earn compensation, and that if either of them did not reach the threshold then neither would 
receive a reward. In the high-pressure condition, participants were told that their partner had already 




feeling of both social and monetary pressure among participants. Lastly, researchers evaluated 
performance by the average number of times participants selected the “increase” deck throughout 
the experiment. Byrne and colleagues found that in the low-pressure condition where there was no 
monetary or social pressure, a person’s level of neuroticism did not influence their performance on 
the task. However, in the high-pressure condition where monetary and social pressure where 
involved, neuroticism was negatively related to performance. These findings suggest that 
individuals with higher levels of neuroticism are more prone to making worse decisions when 
placed under pressure. Given that their study and the present study are both looking at DfE using 
monetary rewards, I hypothesize that neuroticism will be negatively related to search in the loss 
condition since participants will be under more pressure during the experiment during loss trials.  
Hypothesis 4: Neuroticism will be a stronger negative predictor of search in the loss 




Figure 5. The hypothesized relationship showing that individuals with higher levels of 
neuroticism will search less for loss gambles relative to gain gambles. 
 
Finally, I will discuss the remaining three personality traits of the FFM regarding why I do 
not hypothesize relationships between these traits and search behavior. Extraversion has been 
associated with positive affect (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998), assertiveness and excitement seeking 
(DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007), and transformational leadership (Bono & Judge, 2004). In the 
context of information search for new employees, a longitudinal study (Wanberg & Kammeyer-




seeking behavior (as defined by the search for job and organizational information). For this reason, 
it is not hypothesized that the presence of loss gambles will influence the relationship between 
extraversion and search in DfE.  
Weller and Thuli (2012) had participants complete a decision-making task involving both 
gains and losses to see which personality traits of the HEXACO model correlated with risky and 
loss avoidant decision making. The HEXACO model of personality is an alternative model of 
personality which is similar to the FFM with the addition of honesty-humility as a sixth factor 
(Ashton et al., 2004). In their study, Weller and Thuli gave participants two choice options: a risky 
option (50% chance of losing $100 and a 50% chance of losing $0), and a safe option (100% chance 
of losing $50). Participants were given 12 trials with half of the trials consisting of positive choice 
options and half consisting of negative choice options. The authors did not find a significant 
relationship between extraversion and risk-taking for either the loss or gain decisions. For these 
reasons, it is not predicted that extraversion will be associated with search in either the gain or the 
loss condition.   
Openness to experience describes an individual’s tendency to be creative, introspective, 
imaginative, resourceful, and insightful (John & Srivistava, 1999). As stated previously, Wanberg 
and Kammeyer-Mueller (2000) did not find a relationship between the personality trait of openness 
and proactive job information-seeking behaviors in their longitudinal study. Secondly, when looking 
at the relationship between openness and search, Weller and Thuli (2012) did not find a significant 
relationship between openness and risk-taking for the gain or for the loss condition. Since openness 
has not been linked to search in previous research, and because no relationship has been found 
between openness and losses, it is not hypothesized that there will be a link between openness and 




Lastly, it is not predicted that there will be a relationship between agreeableness and search 
in DfE. Previous research which has looked at the relationship between personality and information-
seeking behavior did not hypothesize about or find a relationship between agreeableness and 
information seeking (Tidwell & Sias, 2005). It is also not predicted that there will be any 
relationship between agreeableness and search in either the loss or the gain domains. In their study, 
Weller and Thuli (2012) did not find a significant relationship between agreeableness and risky 
decision making for the loss or the gain condition. For these reasons, it is not hypothesized that 
agreeableness will be related to either information search in the present experiment or that there will 




CHAPTER II. METHODS 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from LSU’s student population using the SONA participant pool. 
Two hundred twenty-four1 participants took part in this study, of whom 54 were removed from the 
final analysis. Forty-one cases were removed for failing the attention check, one case was removed 
for missing data, nine were removed for not paying attention during the sampling task (as defined as 
sampling less than three times on average), and three cases were removed for being extreme outliers 
(6 SDs above the mean) leaving the sample for analyses at 170 participants. The average age of the 
170 participants was 19.8 years old (SD = 2 years), of which 83% were female. Ethnically, most 
participants were Caucasian (72%), followed by African–American (12%), Asian-American (7%), 
Hispanic (7%), and 2% of individuals chose not to specify their race and the demographic 
questionnaire that participants took can be found in Appendix A. Participants were given research 
credit for their participation as well as monetary compensation based on their performance in the 
experiment. Overall, for participants who won money and chose to accept it, the average payout was 
around $2.00.2  
Measures 
 Personality Traits. Personality scores on the FFM were assessed using the Big Five 
Personality Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999). The BFI consists of 44 items which comprise of 5-
dimension subscales, with the number of questions per subscale varying from between eight to ten 
 
1 A power analysis (1-β = .80, α = .05) using the computer program G*power (Faul & Erdfelder, 2007) indicated that a 
total sample of 92 people would be needed to detect a medium effect size (f2=.15). This estimation of effect size was 
based on Frey, Hertwig, & Rieskamp, (2014) who found a medium effect size when looking at how the emotional state 
of fear affected people search behavior in DfE. 
2 The money for this study came from an LSU strategic grant. As part of the requirements of this grant, participants 





items each. All of the items on the BFI are scored using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Past research has found moderate to high levels of internal reliability 
for each of the five subscales ranging from α = .79 to α = .88 as well as high levels of convergent 
and discriminant validity with other Big Five instruments (John & Srivastava, 1999). Some 
examples of sample items include “gets nervous easily” (neuroticism), and “does a thorough job” 
(conscientiousness). The BFI along with its scoring key can be found in Appendix B. 
The Sampling Paradigm. The present study utilized the sampling paradigm described 
previously. The gambles consisted of 20 non-reduced choice pairs where 10 of the gambles were 
gain only, and the other 10 gambles were loss only. Specifically, non-reduced choice pairs were 
selected as past research suggests participants tend to sample more when these types of gambles are 
utilized (Glockner et al., 2016). Additionally, because of this increase in sampling by participants, 
there is a greater chance that researchers will be able to pick up meaningful individual differences in 
search behavior before participants make a final choice. Within each condition, half of the gamble 
pairs had equal expected values (EV), and the other half of the gambles were gamble pairs with 
unequal EVs. The EV of a gamble pair represents the anticipated value of what that gamble pair is 
mathematically worth and for the gambles with unequal EV the gamble pair with the higher EV 
represents the distribution with the better-anticipated payoff. Additionally, the EV for gamble pairs 
for the gain and loss domains were roughly equivalent to each other to ensure that participant’s 
search behavior was not influenced by the EV of each domain. The order in which participants were 
presented the gambles was randomized without replacement, and the gamble pairs which were used 
are a modified version of Pinto and Harman (2017) where loss gambles were also included. The full 






Before beginning the experiment, participants took a demographic questionnaire (Appendix 
A) and the BFI (John & Srivastava, 1999) on Qualtrics. To address careless responding, an attention 
check question was added to the BFI which asked participants if they believed the sky was purple. 
After completing the questionnaire, participants were then presented with the sampling paradigm on 
E-Prime 3.0 on the computer. E-Prime recorded the amount of search (samples drawn) participants 
engaged in before they made a final choice. Before starting the experiment, participants were given 
a set of instructions explaining the sampling paradigm to them. Participants then went through a 
trial round where the instructor explained the sampling paradigm to the participants and where they 
could ask any questions related to the sampling paradigm before beginning the experiment. 
Participants were given 20 different gamble pairs using the sampling paradigm, and gamble pairs 
were randomized without replacement. After each choice, participants were told by the program 
how much money they either gained or lost, and the program calculated the running total at the end 





CHAPTER III. ANALYSIS 
Descriptive statistics, including the variable means, standard deviations, and correlations 
between variables can be found in Table 1. In this study, search behavior was operationally defined 
as the average amount of samples participants drew for all 20 gambles. Across the 20 trials of the 
experiment, participants sampled 15.76 times on average (SD = 7.48) per gamble. Broken down by 
gamble type, participants sampled for a mean of 15.21 times (SD = 7.52) for the gain gambles and a 
mean of 16.31 times (SD = 7.97) for the loss gambles. Participant’s personality scores for 
conscientiousness and neuroticism were as follows: the average conscientiousness score was 3.67 
(SD =.65), and the average neuroticism score was 3.19 (SD = .78). Both of the personality traits of 
conscientiousness and neuroticism also showed adequate reliability (conscientiousness, α = .79), 
(neuroticism, α = .82). 
Table 1. The means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients for the different personality 
traits with search behavior. 
 
   Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Conscientiousness 3.67 .65 (.79) 
     
 
2. Neuroticism 3.19 .78 -.14 (.82) 
    
 
3. Openness 3.45 .61 -.03 .13 (.72) 
   
 
4. Extraversion 3.27 .87 .07 -.25** .07 (.89) 
  
 
5. Agreeableness 4.05 .49 .18* -.30** .13 .11 (.66) 
 
 
6. Search Total 15.76 7.48 -.04 .06 -.05 -.12 -.05 -  
7. Search Gain 15.21 7.52 -.06 .11 .00 -.14 -.09 .96** - 
8. Search Loss 16.32 7.97 -.02 .00 -.09 -.10 -.01 .97** .87** 
Note. N = 170. *p < .05, **p < .01. Numbers in parentheses denote the reliability estimates for each 
personality trait.  
 
Next, I conducted a series of confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) to confirm the factor 
structure of each personality trait using the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012), in the free statistical 




personality trait individually. The goodness of fit threshold for these indices were CFI > 0.90, 
SRMR < 0.08, RMSEA < .08 (Hair, Ringle, Hult, & Sarstedt, 2013). Overall, each personality trait 
exhibited adequate fit (see Table 2). All of the personality traits nearly met or exceeded the 
aforementioned cutoffs with the exception of the CFI for openness (.84). The personality traits of 
conscientiousness and neuroticism both indicated adequate fit with both personality traits meeting 
the threshold for goodness of fit for CFI, SRMR, however, both personality traits were slightly 
above the threshold score for RMSEA with scores of .083 and .105 respectively.  
Table 2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis Model Fit.  
 ꭓ2 df SRMR CFI TLI RMSEA CI  
Conscientiousness 370.65 36 0.062 0.906 0.875 0.083 (.054, .112) 
Neuroticism 390.39 28 0.058 0.897 0.856 0.105 (.073, .137) 
Openness 390.10 45 0.069 0.835 0.788 0.098 (.074, .122) 
Extraversion 739.40 28 0.050 0.954 0.936 0.098 (.066, .131) 
Agreeableness 189.20 36 0.058 0.930 0.907 0.048 (.000, .082) 
 
Note. N = 170. df = model degrees of freedom. RMSEA = root mean squared error of 
approximation. SRMSR = standardized root squared mean residual. CFI = Comparative Fit Index. 
TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index. CI = 90% confidence interval. 
 
Prior to testing the hypotheses, all assumptions were checked, which were met with the 
exception of normality. The assumption of normality was violated with the Shapiro-Wilk test for 
normality obtaining a significant value indicating that all of the variables did not follow a normal 
distribution. To compensate for this violation, each variable was transformed using Templeton’s 
(2011) two-step method which transforms continuous variables into normal variables in SPSS, and 
the correlations between variables after the transformation can be found in Table 3. After the 
transformation for normality, linearity was checked using scatterplots, which exhibited a linear 
relationship between the Big 5 personality traits and overall search behavior as well as for both 




plots, and there was no multicollinearity in the data with Variance inflation factors (VIF) falling 
within the normal range. All hypotheses were tested using the transformed dataset after all 
assumption checks were met.  
Table 3. Correlation coefficients for personality traits with search behavior after the transformation 
for normality.  
 
   Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Conscientiousness 
      
 
2. Neuroticism -.13 
     
 
3. Openness -.03 .12 
    
 
4. Extraversion .09 -.26** .09 
   
 
5. Agreeableness .19* -.32** .14 .11 
  
 
6. Search Total -.01 .02 -.05 -.12 -.04 
 
 
7. Search Gain -.01 .10 -.14 -.14 -.10 .95**  
8. Search Loss -.02 -.03 -.06 -.10 .02 .96** .85** 
Note. N = 170 *p < .05, **p < .01 
Following the assumption checks, Hypothesis 1 was tested using a standard linear regression 
examining the relationship between conscientiousness and overall search behavior. The relationship 
was non-significant (F(1, 167) = .018, p =.90), thus Hypothesis 1 was not supported. Next, 
Hypothesis 2 was tested by comparing the differences in search behavior based on the average 
amount of samples drawn for the loss and gain gambles. Specifically, this hypothesis was tested 
using a one tailed Z test for a comparison of nonindependent Pearson correlation coefficients 
(Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992) in the R package cocor 1.01 (Diedenhofen & Musch, 2015). 
This test converts a Pearson’s r to a Z score, which identifies if there is a statistically significant 
difference between two different correlations that share the same predictor variable. No significant 
difference between the correlation coefficients of conscientiousness by decision domain (gains or 
losses) was found (z = .24, p = .41), thus Hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
Subsequently, a second linear regression was used to look at the relationship between 




166) = .099, p = .75), thus Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Hypothesis 4 was tested by using the 
Meng, Rosenthal, and Rubin, (1992) test, which did present a significant difference when 
comparing the correlation coefficients of neuroticism by decision domain (z = 3.07, p < .01) and 
Figure 6 illustrates the differences between the correlations. While the relationship between 
neuroticism and search for the gain condition (r = .10, p = .19) as well as the loss condition (r = -
.03, p = .74) were not statistically distinguishable from a correlation of zero, a significant difference 
was found between the correlations of neuroticism and search between decision domains in the 
predicted direction. Since the correlations between neuroticism and search based on decision 
domain were significantly different from each other, it is possible that neuroticism influences search 
differentially in gain and loss environments. Therefore, since a significant difference was found 
between the correlation coefficients of neuroticism by decision domain Hypothesis 4 was partially 
supported, however the small effect size and inconsistent results from the previous hypotheses point 
to the possibility of a type I error and a replication of this result with more power would be 
advisable.      
A supplemental analysis was also conducted to examine whether personality traits were 
correlated with average alternation rates (see Table 4). Alternation rates were calculated by counting 
the number of times that an individual switched sampling between the two different gamble options 
and then dividing that number by the overall amount of sample draws that an individual took during 
the trial. An individual’s average alternation rate was then computed by taking a person’s 
alternation rate for each of the 20 trials and then averaging it and a person’s alternation rate is 
relevant for looking at their overall search strategy (piecewise or comprehensive). Across all 20 
trials, participants switched sampling between gamble options 6 times on average (SD = 5.79) 




options 5.91 times (SD = 5.77) on average for the gain domain and switched on average 6.23 times 
(SD = 6.04) for the loss domain. The findings of the analysis revealed that none of the factors of the 
FFM significantly correlated with alternation rates overall or within each domain specifically and 
that none of the personality traits of the FFM were relevant in predicting they type of search strategy 
that an individual would use.  
Table 4. Correlation coefficients for personality traits with alternation rates. 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Conscientiousness        
2. Neuroticism -.14       
3. Openness -.03 .13      
4. Extroversion .07 -.25** .07     
5. Agreeableness .18* -.30** .13 .11    
6. A-Rate Total .04 -.01 .04 .13 .08   
7. A-Rate Gains .04 -.01 .02 .13 .09 .99**  
8. A-Rate Loss .03 -.01 .04 .14 .07 .99** .98** 







Figure 6. The difference between the correlations of neuroticism and search based on decision 
domain within the gain domain neuroticism was positively associated with search, and in the loss 





CHAPTER IV. DISCUSSION 
  Many major organizational decisions, such as determining which new technologies to 
purchase or deciding which applicants to hire, rely on experiential sampling, such as employers 
identifying different technologies before selecting one to purchase, or interviewing different 
applicants before making a selection decision. Understanding individual differences in search is also 
important for instances where only losses or costs are involved, such as selecting a primary 
healthcare provider for the company. Yet, despite the importance of understanding differences in 
individual search behavior, little research has addressed this topic directly. The purpose of the 
current study was to contribute to the literature on individual differences by examining how 
differences in personality predicted search behavior for different types of DfE. The results of the 
present study did not indicate that the personality traits of conscientiousness or neuroticism were 
predictive or relevant for influencing the amount of search that people engaged in before making 
DfE.  
 While past research has found that conscientiousness is linked to more deliberate decision 
making (McCrae & Costa, 1994; Costa et al., 1991), it is possible that more deliberation did not 
translate itself into more sampling by participants. Instead, conscientious individuals may have 
started deliberating between the different options once they finished sampling between choices, and 
as a result, did not sample more than the average participant. Another reason why conscientiousness 
was theorized to be positively correlated with search was because of its association with higher 
levels of accomplishment striving (Barrick et al., 2002), in that conscientious individuals may be 
more focused on accomplishing their goal of trying to earn as much money as possible in the 




in the experiment were minimal, (participants on average only earned $2.00) conscientious 
individuals may not have been focused on earning as much money as possible and as a result, 
accomplishment striving may not have been as relevant in this experiment.  
 Regarding the relationship between conscientiousness and search in the loss domain, it was 
hypothesized that conscientious individuals would search more in the loss domain relative to the 
gain domain in DfE. Based on previous research linking conscientiousness and loss aversion (Boyce 
et al., 2016) and its relation to higher levels of internal locus of control (Costa et al., 1991), I 
hypothesized that conscientiousness would be more strongly associated with search in the loss 
domain. As the results of the present study were not consistent with previous literature regarding the 
relationship between loss aversion and conscientiousness, one possible explanation for this 
inconsistency might be the magnitude of losses that individuals faced. Specifically, Boyce and 
colleagues (2016) measured loss aversion by looking at how losses in income affected a person’s 
overall level of happiness in a longitudinal study. Alternatively, the present study measured loss 
aversion by looking to see if participants increased the number of times they pressed the sample 
button in an experiment involving a few dollars. This difference in the magnitude of loss may 
explain why no relationship was found. Additionally, it was also hypothesized that within the loss 
domain, conscientious individuals would engage in more protective measures through the use of 
search to help prevent losses to their previously earned gains, which was also not supported in the 
present study. It might be the case that participants did not believe that drawing more samples in the 
experiment would help them make a better decision, and as a result, they may not have viewed 
increased sampling as a way to reduce their losses.  
Neuroticism, like conscientiousness, was also unrelated to overall search behavior. It was 




research has found a link between neuroticism and impulsive decision making in a variety of 
different contexts (Brunborg et al., 2016; Elfhag & Morey, 2008). However, based on the results of 
the present study, it appears that impulsiveness did not play a role in determining the amount of 
search that people engaged in before making DfE in the current sample. While a significant 
difference was observed between the correlation coefficients of neuroticism and search based on 
decision domain. Future work is needed to explore if losses influence the relationship between 
neuroticism and search within DfE since neuroticism was not found to be a significant predictor of 
search in either condition. 
The present study contributes to the current literature on individual search behavior by 
providing initial evidence that the personality traits of conscientiousness and neuroticism do not 
play a significant role in influencing the amount of search people engage in within DfE using the 
sampling paradigm. Additionally, conscientiousness and neuroticism were not associated with 
participant alternation rates and were not correlated with the amount of switching between options 
participants performed within the sampling paradigm. Lastly, when broken down by decision 
domain, neither conscientiousness or neuroticism were found to be significant predictors of search 
in either the gain or the loss conditions despite a significant difference emerging between the 
correlation coefficients of neuroticism and search across conditions. These null findings may still be 
relevant for many organizations, as they suggest that overall conscientiousness and neuroticism are 
not a defining factor for a job that requires search based on DfE. This study also contributes to 
personality literature by exploring how different personality traits react to losses relative to gains 
and suggests other avenues of research using individual differences that may explain why there is 







One of the limitations of this study was that the sample population was primarily comprised 
of female undergraduate psychology students. The sample population in the study was close to 80% 
female, which may have had an impact on search behavior. As previous research has found that 
women tend to be more risk-averse than men (Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman, & Meijers, 2009) this 
risk aversion may have caused a higher overall sample rate which would make it more difficult to 
pick up on any individual differences. Another potential limitation of the sample population is that 
prior research has found that females aged 21-30 tend to have higher levels of neuroticism than both 
men of similar ages and women who are over 30 (Srivastava et al., 2003). Because the sample for 
this study was primarily females in their early to late twenties, this increased level of neuroticism 
across the board may have also made it harder to pick up on individual differences between 
neuroticism and search overall and for each condition. Lastly, Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, and Hertwig 
(2008) found in Study 2 of their paper that increased financial incentives led to individual searching 
significantly more in the high incentive condition when compared to the number of samples 
participants drew in the regular sampling paradigm. Specifically, for the high incentive condition, 
the payout ratio was multiplied by 10 for each gamble, and they found that individuals in the high 
incentive condition sampled considerably more (Mdraws = 33) when compared to the standard payout 
condition (Mdraws = 11). Since high incentives were not used in the present study, the use of regular 
incentives may have served as a limitation on two counts. First, participants may not have been as 
driven to earn as much money as possible because they only had a chance of winning up to $5 in the 
experiment. Alternatively, had high incentives been used, participants may have been more focused 




money in the experiment. In this scenario, higher levels of conscientiousness and accomplishment 
striving might have been relevant in increasing the amount of search individuals drew with the goal 
of maximizing their earnings in the experiment. Secondly, had higher incentives been used, it is 
more likely that individuals may have been much more nervous during the experiment in general 
and especially for the loss only trials. In this case, it is possible that individuals with higher levels of 
neuroticism would have sampled less as a result of them being more nervous and that a more 
explicit relationship between neuroticism and search within the loss condition would have been 
found.  
Future Research  
The goal of the present study was to examine whether conscientiousness and neuroticism 
predicted search behavior in DfE within different contexts. While the results of this study did not 
indicate that either conscientiousness or neuroticism was relevant for explaining the high levels of 
interindividual variability in search within DfE, there are many other avenues of research that have 
yet to be explored. Future research should look at different measures of individual differences, such 
as risk propensity (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992), need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) and 
tolerance for ambiguity (Herman, Stevens, Bird, Mendenhall, & Oddou, 2010). Risk propensity may 
be relevant in influencing search behavior within DfE, with people who are less tolerant for risk 
searching more in the loss condition to try to figure out the frequencies of the different gamble 
options. Secondly, need for cognition might also be relevant for explaining individual differences in 
search using the sampling paradigm. Need for cognition is an individual difference which refers to a 
person’s tendency to engage in and enjoy activities related to effortful thinking. In the context of the 
sampling paradigm, individuals with higher levels of need for cognition may sample more in their 




tolerance for ambiguity may be relevant for both explaining individual variability in the amount of 
search people engage in and for explaining alternation rates in search. Tolerance for ambiguity 
refers to the tendency of individuals to perceive ambiguous situations as desirable (Bunder, 1962). 
In the context of search, it is predicted that individuals with lower tolerances for ambiguity will not 
only search more but that they will also alternate more between options so that they have a better 
sense of the frequencies for the different gamble options.  
Conclusion 
 Understanding why individuals search differently when it comes to making DfE is a 
question that has often been sidestepped by previous literature. Knowing which type of person 
searches more in experientially based decisions can be very beneficial for organizations to know for 
selecting the right candidate in a job where they must search between different alternatives. To this 
end, the goal of the current study was to see if the personality traits of conscientiousness or 
neuroticism could help explain individual variability in search within DfE overall and in situations 
involving both exclusively gains or losses. Overall, the present study did not find that either 
conscientiousness or neuroticism were predictive of overall search in DfE, and neither of these 
personality traits were predictive of search in either the gain or the loss only condition. While a 
significant difference was found between the correlation coefficients of neuroticism and search 
based on decision domain future work is needed to confirm this exploratory finding as neither 






APPENDIX A. DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
1. What is your ethnicity? 
Asian 
African American  
Hispanic or Latino 















APPENDIX B. THE BIG FIVE INVENTORY (BFI) 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do you agree that 
you are someone who likes to spend time with others? Please write a number next to each statement to 
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. 










1 2 3 4 5 
 
I see Myself as Someone Who... 
 
  1. Is talkative   23. Tends to be lazy 
 
  2. Tends to find fault with others   24. Is emotionally stable, not easily upset 
  3. Does a thorough job 
 
  4. Is depressed, blue 
  25. Is inventive 
 
  26. Has an assertive personality
 
  5. Is original, comes up with new ideas   27. Can be cold and aloof 
 
  6. Is reserved   28. Perseveres until the task is finished 
  7. Is helpful and unselfish with others 
 
  8. Can be somewhat careless 
 
  9. Is relaxed, handles stress well 
  29. Can be moody 
 
  30. Values artistic, aesthetic experiences 
 
  31. Is sometimes shy, inhibited
 
  10. Is curious about many different things      ____32. Is considerate and kind to almost 
everyone 
 
  11. Is full of energy   33. Does things efficiently 
 
  12. Starts quarrels with others   34. Remains calm in tense situations 
 
  13. Is a reliable worker   35. Prefers work that is routine 
 
  14. Can be tense   36. Is outgoing, sociable 
 





 16. Generates a lot of enthusiasm  38. Makes plans and follows through with 
them                                                                                             
      
 17. Has a forgiving nature   39. Gets nervous easily 
  18. Tends to be disorganized   40. Likes to reflect, play with ideas 
  19. Worries a lot   41. Has few artistic interests 
____20. Has an active imagination  ____42. Likes to cooperate with others 
____21. Tends to be quiet  ____43. Is easily distracted 
____22. Is generally trusting  ____44. Is sophisticated in art, music, or literature 
 
Scoring: 
BFI scale scoring (“R” denoves reverse scored items): 
Extraversion: 1, 6R, 11, 16, 21R, 26, 31R, 36 
Agreeableness: 2R, 7, 12R, 17, 22, 27R, 32, 37R, 42 
Conscientiousness: 3, 8R, 13, 18R, 23R, 28, 33, 38, 43R 
Neuroticism: 4, 9R, 14, 19, 24R, 29, 34R, 39 















APPENDIX C. SAMPLE GAMBLES 
 
The gambles chosen were based off Pinto & Harman, (2017) and where modified to include 
gambles that contain roughly equivalent expected values (EVs) for the gambles with losses. Each 
gamble presented was randomized without replacement. For each option presented, the first 
number represents the outcome (money earned or lost), which is then followed by its subsequent 
probability, and the numbers in parenthesis represent the second outcome followed by its 
probability. Additionally, bolded and underlined options indicate the option with the higher 




















Gamble #1 1.25, .40 (0.25, .60) 0.45, .95 (0.10, .05) 0.65 0.43 No  15.43 (11.21) 
 
94% 
Gamble #2  0.75, .40 (0.20, .60) 0.90, .90 (0.15, .10) 0.42 0.83 No  12.65 (7.42) 10% 
Gamble #3 1.10, .45 (0.25, .55) 1.50, .05 (0.40, .95) 0.63 0.46 No  18.03 (13.97) 66% 
Gamble #4 0.50, .75 (0.15, .25) 0.95, .60 (0.10, .40) 0.41 0.61 No  14.55 (13.97) 15% 
Gamble #5 0.75, .80 (0.20, .20) 0.50, .70 (0.35, .30) 0.64 0.46 No  14.46 (10.67) 87% 
Gamble #6  0.60, .75 (0.30, .25) 0.30, .50 (0.45, .50) 0.53 0.53 Yes 14.49 (8.78) 89% 
Gamble #7 1.20, .40 (0.20, .60) 0.85, .30 (0.50, .70) 0.60 0.61* Yes 17.06 (12.65) 69% 
Gamble #8  0.70, .25 (0.30, .75) 0.50, .65 (0.20, .35) 0.40 0.40 Yes 16.11 (11.27) 62% 
Gamble #9  0.80, .70 (0.10, .30) 0.70, .80 (0.15, .20)         0.59 0.59 Yes 14.26 (11.27) 66% 
Gamble #10 1.00, .50 (0.20, .50) 0.70, .75 (0.30, .25)   0.60 0.60 Yes 15.04 (11.96) 69% 
Gamble #11 -1.10, .40 (-.35, .60) -.45, .90 (-.20, .10) -0.65 -0.43 No  15.95 (12.10) 32% 
Gamble #12 -0.55, .40(-.30, .6) -0.85, .95 (-.25, .05) -0.43 -0.82 No  16.75 (11.40) 88% 
Gamble #13 -1.15, .45 (-.20, .55) -1.40, .05 (-.40, .95) -0.63 -0.45 No  17.53 (12.88) 56% 
Gamble #14 -.45, .80 (-.25, .20) -90, .60 (-.20, .40) -0.41 -0.62 No  16.11 (11.37) 64% 
Gamble #15 -.80, .75 (-.20, .25) -.60, .65 (-.20, .35) -0.65 -0.46 No  17.34 (11.84) 11% 
Gamble #16 -.65, .75 (-.15, .25) -.60, .65(-.40, .35) -0.53 -0.53 Yes 17.99 (13.67) 61% 
Gamble #17 -1.15, .40 (-.25, .60) -.80, .45 (-.45, .55) -0.61 -0.61 Yes 14.98 (9.18) 65% 
Gamble #18 -.65, .30 (-.30, .70) -.55, .60, (-.20, .40) -0.41 -0.41 Yes 14.77 (9.88) 6% 
Gamble #19 -.80, .65 (-.20, .35) -.75, .65 (-.30, .35) -0.59 -0.59 Yes 16.74 (12.64) 55% 
Gamble #20 -.90, .60 (-.15, .40) -.75, .75 (-.15, .25) -0.60 -0.60 Yes 15.01 (10.11) 37% 
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